Jurisprudence and Structural Realism by Lee, Kevin
Campbell University School of Law
Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2017
Jurisprudence and Structural Realism
Kevin Lee
Campbell University School of Law, leek@campbell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/fac_sw
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Kevin Lee, Jurisprudence and Structural Realism, 5 Legal Issues J 63 (2017).
Jurisprudence and Structural Realism 
Kevin Lee^ 
Some Anglophone legal theorists look to analytic philosophy 
for core presuppositions. For example, the epistemological 
theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard Quine shape 
the theories of Dennis Patterson and Brian Leiter, respec­
tively. These epistemologies are anti-foundational since they 
reject the kind of certain grounding that is exemplified in 
Cartesian philosophy. And, they are coherentist in that they 
seek to legitimate truth-claims by reference to entire linguis­
tic systems. While these theories are insightful, the current 
context of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) has created new informational concepts and issues. As 
a result, the analytic epistemologies are increasingly chal­
lenged by alternative perspectives. One such alternative is 
Structural Realism (SR), which is influential among the nat­
ural sciences, and especially physics. "Informational Struc­
tural Realism," (ISR) is a variant of SR that was introduced 
by Luciano Floridi. Unlike the coherentist theories, ISR pro­
motes examination of the connections among types of infor­
mation and informational structures. It is an important shift 
for legal theory today, since the challenges that the ICT pre­
sents have to do with pattern recognition across vast domains 
of diverse data. An informational jurisprudence is now re­
quired to understand the issues emerging from the ICT. 
^Associate Professor of Law, Campbell University, Norman A. Wiggins School 
of Law. Many thanks to Hannah Murphy who read drafts of this essay and 
provided valuable comments. 
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1. Introduction 
Epistemology is changing in the twenty-first century as the consequences 
of information and communication technology (ICT) are being applied to 
philosophy. The dominant theories in jurisprudence have viewed infor­
mation as semantic and legitimation within a linguistic system or herme­
neutic circle. Seeds of change were planted, however, in the early twenti­
eth century by Claude Shannon and Alan Turing, who respectively devel­
oped mathematical theories of information and communications. It is their 
equations, which make ICT possible, that have profound implications for 
philosophical inquiry. Computational power has exploded in the last few 
decades. It now allows for subde relational structures to be discerned that 
are beyond human comprehension and, as a result, philosophers are faced 
with new concepts and issues that cast doubt on old beliefs. The philoso­
phy of information has emerged to cope with the philosophical issues that 
have developed in this context. Philosophers of information investigate 
the nature of informational types and the relations between them.^ Some 
of their work challenges the epistemological presuppositions that have 
become the dogma of Anglophone jurisprudence. 
Nonetheless, with the faithful commitment of medieval scholastics, 
most legal theorists dogmatically view law as exclusively semantic infor­
mation, even while acknowledging that law shapes and is shaped by the 
vast pools of data that are generated and analyzed every day around the 
world.^ Of course, law is semantic information, but this is only a trivial 
^For a discussion of the conceptual shift that occurred, see Floridi, The 4th 
Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality (Oxford 
University Press, 2014). For an introduction to the Philosophy of Information, 
see Floridi, Information: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
2010). For a more developed survey, see Floridi, The Philosophy of Information 
(Oxford University Press, 2011). 
'Philosophical understanding of the informational nature of law is a subfield of 
the Philosophy of Information. Luciano Floridi describes the field this way: 
"Information is the Cinderella stoiy in the history of philosophy. Think of it for 
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observation. An alternative epistemological theory, structural realism 
(which is influential among the natural sciences), provides a more capa­
cious and promising alternative to the mainstream theories. Extending 
structural realism into jurisprudence refocuses legal philosophy away 
from the boundaries between concepts, towards the analysis of the infor­
mational types, structures, and systems that constitute and are constituted 
by the law. 
To illustrate this change in the focus for philosophy, consider the fol­
lowing two passages. The first is from Andrei Marmor's influential book. 
Philosophy of Law:'* 
The content of law is tantamount to the content that is com­
municated by various legal authorities. Authorities com­
municate, of course, in a natural language. Therefore, an un­
derstanding of how linguistic communications works and, in 
particular, how much is actually determined by various se­
mantic and pragmatic aspects of language is central to under­
standing what law is.^ 
Marmor argues that law is semantic information that communicates the 
intentions of the authorized law maker. While this is a reasonable obser­
vation, it does not acknowledge a role for the digital form in which law 
also exists. 
Consider next how Marmor's conventional understanding of law is 
transformed by the second passage, which is taken from Fred I. Dretske's 
a moment. Understanding information is a necessary input for any philosophy 
of knowledge, no matter whether ordinary (epistemology) or scientific 
(philosophy of science). There is no ethic without choices, responsibilities, and 
moral evaluations, yet all these need a lot of relevant and reliable information 
and quite a good management of it." Floridi, 'Introduction' in Floridi, The 
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Information (New York: Roudedge, 
2016), 1. The same is true for law, of course. No legal decision is made without 
information that includes the semantic meaning of the law and an increasing 
variety of non-semantic informational forms. 
"Marmor, Philosophy of Law (Princeton University Press, 2011). 
^Ibid, 136. 
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ambitious book, Knowledge and the Flow of Information.^ Dretske at­
tempts to develop a theory of knowledge based on Shannon's mathemat­
ical theory of information/ A foundation for Shannon's theory is to dis­
tinguish information from meaning. Dretske explains the importance of 
this distinction: 
Once this distinction is clearly understood, one is free to 
think of information (though not meaning) as an objective 
commodity, something whose generation, transmission, and 
reception do not require or in any way presuppose. One is 
therefore given a framework for understanding how meaning 
can evolve, how genuine cognitive systems—those with the 
resources for interpreting signals, holding beliefs, and ac­
quiring knowledge—can develop out of lower-order, purely 
physical, information-processing mechanisms. The higher-
level accomplishment associated with intelligent life can be 
seen as manifestations of progressively more efficient ways 
of handling and coding information. Meaning, and the con­
stellation of mental attitudes that exhibit it, are manufactured 
product. The raw material is information.® 
From Dretske's perspective, much more attention should be paid to the 
processes by which digital information becomes semantic meaning. He 
intends to suggest that Shannon's theory is thus important not only for 
enabling ICT, but also for changing the concept of information. Shan­
non's insight is that information can be separate from meaning. When it 
is viewed in that way, it can be seen to be an abundant feature in nature. 
Before Shannon, information was a purely a semantic phenomenon, as 
law is for Marmor. After Shannon, the concept of information refers to 
many different forms: semantic, binary, biological, and others. No partic-
®Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Center for the Study of 
Language and Information, 1999). 
'See Shannon, 'The Mathematical Theory of Communication' (1948) 27 Bell 
System Technical J. 379, reprinted in Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication (The University of Illinios Press, 1963), 29. 
®Ibid., vii. 
66 
Jurisprudence and Structural Realism 
ular type is dominant. Information refers to a distributed network of con­
cepts.® Structural realism rejects what united the views of Quine and Witt­
genstein (and perhaps Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, McLuhan 
and Rorty)/" who saw information as "a self-referential circle of herme-
neutic communication."" Structural realism of the sort defended here re­
jects this epistemological analysis. It views the multitude of informational 
types as being about something existing external to a hermeneutic circle. 
It highlights the relations among the many types of information that exist, 
and how the centrality of semantic information is presupposed and the 
effective impact of information on human beings is ignored. The semantic 
meaning of law is about the drama human lives, but the formation and 
operation of law are about informational types that are not limited to se­
mantic hermeneutics. Structural realism (particularly the informationally-
focused form described herein), escapes the dogmatic reduction of law to 
semantics, and allows for a broader role for legal philosophy in under­
standing the interactions and structures of a multitude of informational 
types. 
A jurisprudence of information examines the informational processes 
of law. Some of these processes are included as part of what Marmor calls 
the "pragmatics" of language, but as Dretske's work suggests, a close 
analysis of the processes and dynamics of information flow is insightful 
for understanding the informational structures (relata). While Dreske fo­
cuses on binary information, his work suggests that law might be influ­
enced (directly and indirectiy) by multiple informational forms and di­
verse informational content. An information jurisprudence could help to 
clarify the types of information relations, structures, systems and dynam­
ics that influence law and legal institutions. It is a new way to understand 
law in a contemporary age where Big Data and Artificial Intelligence 
bring to light concealed patterns of relation, and automated systems learn 
through abstracting inferences from increasingly large and diverse data 
sets. 
To make this point in another way, consider Hart's "folk" understand­
ing of law, which is derived by intuiting the commonplace usage of the 
®Floridi, 'Introduction', 2. 
^"Ibid, 2-3. 
"ibid., 3. 
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12 
term by a generally educated Englishman of the mid-twentieth century. 
For this imagined person, law's information is simply semantic infor­
mation as it is for Marmor. Today, however, the word "information" is so 
closely associated with ICT that one is first likely to associate legal in­
formation" with something contained in the digital infrastructure. Legal 
information is sought out (even by laypersons) through search engines 
that employ vast telecommunications networks and utilize the most ad­
vanced artificial intelligence.'" Furthermore, a generally educated twenty-
first century person would be aware that the information is analyzed and 
applied by algorithms that utilize advanced mathematics.'® Today, legal 
'^Hart argues that, "Any educated man might be expected to be able to identify 
these salient features [of law] in some such skeleton way as follows: They 
comprise (i) rules forbidding or enjoying certain types of behavior under 
penalty; (ii) rules requiring people to compensate those whom they injure in 
certain ways; (iii) rules specifying what must be done to make wills, contracts 
or other arrangements which confer rights and create obligations; (iv) courts 
determine what the rules are and when they have been broken, and to fix the 
punishment or compensation to be paid; (v) a legislature to make new rules and 
abolish old ones." Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1994), 
3. 
''See, e.g., Kuhlthau and Tama, 'Information Search Process of Lawyers: A 
Call for "Just for Me" Information Services' (2001) 57 J. Documentation 25, 
32, 34, 36-37. Many resources are listed in 'Information Behavior' {Legal 
Information Systems & Legal Informatics Resources) 
<http://www.personal.psu.edu/rcr5122/Dissertations.html> Jan. 23, 2017. 
'"Among the most sophisticated use-cases at the time of this writing is offered 
by the artificial intelligence company Ross Intelligence, Inc., which uses 
advanced natural language programing. Ross Intelligence 
<http://www.rossintelligence.com> Jan. 23, 2017. 
'^he empirical analysis of law is a well-established field. For background see, 
Eisenberg, 'The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a 
Response to Concerns' (2011) 2011 U. Illinois L. Rev. 1713-38; see, e.g., for 
the systems theories approaches, Katz and Bommarito, 'Measuring the 
Complexity of the Law: The United States Code' (2014) 22 Artificial 
Intelligence and L. 337; Bommarito and Katz, 'A Mathematical Approach to 
the Study of the United States Code' (2010) 389 Physica A: Stat. Mechanics 
and its Applications; Ruhl, 'Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the 
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism 
and the Modern Administrative State' (1996) 45 Duke L. J. 849; 
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information both is shaped by Big Data and is the data exhaust of the 
global society. Law is both a creator and a result of social interaction that 
occur digitally, and flows endlessly from glowing screens and automated 
voices. 
Thus, awareness of law's binary existence has grown immensely for 
even Hart's 'commonly educated person'. In the 1990s, Lawrence Lessig 
introduced the saying "Law is code" to refer to the idea that law is algo­
rithmic—that it is computational in the sense that it can describe a set of 
procedures. Nonetheless, even though this subtle shift in meaning is oc­
curring, jurisprudence continues to understand law as exclusively logico-
linguistic information.'® A new approach to jurisprudence is needed, one 
that can harmonize legal theory with the computational-mathematical 
Miller, 'Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin' 
(2000) 20 Pace L. Rev. 409; and Katz, 'Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or— 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven 
Future of the Legal Services Industry'(2012) 62 Emory L. J. 909. 
'®Mireille Hildebrant observes, "The deep structure of modem law has been 
built on the affordances of the printing press: on the linearity and sequential 
processing demands of written text, which evoices the need for interpretation, 
reflection and contestation. The study and practice of law have thus been 
focused on establishing the meaning of legal norms and their applicability to 
relevant human interactions, while establishing the meaning of human action in 
the light of the applicable legal norms. Data-driven agency builds on an entirely 
different grammar, its building blocks are information and behaviour, not 
meaning and action. We need to face the possibility that this will drain the life 
from the law, turning it into a handmaiden of governance (that fashionable term 
meaning anything to anybody), devouring the procedural kemel of the Rule of 
Law that enables people to stand up for their rights against big players, whether 
governmental or corporate or otherwise. In this article I will test the interface 
between law and data-driven agency by understanding law in terms of 
information, assuming that we cannot take for granted that law will interact 
with an artificially intelligent ICT infrastructure (ICTI) in the same way as it 
has interacted with written and printed text (our previous and current ICTI). By 
framing law as information, I hope to convince the reader that technological 
infrastructures matter, require our attention and must somehow be brought 
under the Rule of Law. This will not be business as usual, as it will require 
rethinking and redesigning the architecture of the Rule of Law." Hildebrandt, 
'Law as Data in the Era of Data Driven Agency' (2016) 79 The Mod. L. Rev. 1, 
2. 
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methods that are of growing importance. To achieve this change in theo­
retical perspective, the dogma of anti-foundationalism and coherentism— 
the hermeneutic circle—needs to be replaced by structural realism be­
cause the informational context of contemporary life presents new and 
challenging questions that go unmet by the older theories. Viewed in this 
light, a new foundation for jurisprudence is a normal development in the 
evolution of legal thought. The need today is for a theoretical framework 
that focuses less on static boundaries between concepts and more on the 
dynamics of structural relations among informational systems. 
To support this claim, this essay explores the three most important the­
ories for Anglophone legal philosophy in the twentieth century. Two have 
been influential in American jurisprudence, which has been concerned 
with developing a logico-linguistic understanding of truth: Willard 
Quine's coherentist holism'' (which influenced Brian Leiter's naturalized 
jurisprudence),'® and Ludwig Wittgenstein's logico-linguistic philoso­
phy'® (which influenced Dennis Patterson's description of the modalities 
of legal legitimacy).^" The third approach, structural realism,^' while pres­
ently unknown in jurisprudence, is quite influential in the philosophy of 
science (especially the philosophy of physics),^^ and could be used as a 
foundation for a new information-theoretic understanding of law. 
The information-theoretic standpoint of structural realism stands in 
contrast to Quine and Wittgenstein. They agreed on several fundamental 
topics (ahhough they have had their disagreements as well)." Critically, 
"Leiter relies primarily on two of Quine's essays: 'The Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism,' and 'Naturalizing Epistemology," discussed infra at 12-21. 
'®Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 1996). 
'^Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2001). 
^"Patterson, Law and Truth (Oxford University Press, 1996). 
^'Ladyman, 'Structural Realism', (Stan. Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jan. 10, 
2014), <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/> Feb. 25, 2017. 
^^See, e.g., French and Ladyman, 'Remodeling Structural Realism: Quantum 
Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure' (2003) 136 Synthese 31-56. 
"See Hacker, 'Wittgenstein and Quine: Proximity at a Great Distance', in 
Arrington and Clock, Wittgenstein and Quine (New York: Routledge, 1996) 1-
38. 
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they are both skeptics since they deny that there are foundations for logi­
cal reasoning;^" and they are both coherentists in the sense that they be­
lieve that the only legitimation for a proposition is its coherence in a sys­
tem of linguistic usage. These themes of skepticism and coherentism 
are reflected in Leiter's and Patterson's work as well.^® 
Structural realism holds that knowledge is possible of the structural re­
lations between entities. It is minimally realist, since it allows only for 
knowledge of the existence of entities and the relations among them, but 
otherwise it maintains the Kantian distinction between phenomena and 
noumena (i.e., knowledge of the nature of things-in-themselves is not pos­
sible).The origins of structural realism are associated with Mortiz 
Schlick,^® and it was developed by Grover Maxwell, John Warrell, and 
^''Hacker notes: 'Both repudiate classical foundationalism in epistemology. 
Quine's stance is epitomized in the dictum that "There is not first philosophy." 
Holism displaces foundationalism, and 'naoiralized epistemology', drawing 
upon psychology, neurophysiology and physics, replaces the investigation of 
the justification of knowledge claims with causal explanations. Wittgenstein's 
private language arguments undermine classical foundationalism. It is replaced 
(in On Certainty) not by naturalized epistemology but by socialized 
epistemology." Ibid, 3. 
^^Hacker explains, "One of the most famous Wittgensteinian dictum is 'Don't 
ask for the meaning, ask for the use.' Quine, in one of his relatively rare 
references to Wittgenstein, quotes it approvingly." Ibid. (Quine and 
Wittgenstein disagree on many points as too, including, critically, Quine rejects 
Wittgenstein's view of the normativity of language.) Hacker explains. 
From the point of view of a normative conception of meaning such as 
Wittgenstein defends, a behaviouristic conception like Quine's is simply no 
conception of meaning at all, not even an ersatz one. Indeed, it is not a 
conception of language, for a language stripped of normativity is no more 
language than chess stripped of its rules is a game. 
Ibid, 15-16. 
^®See infra pp. 28-29. 
^^For a brief introduction to Structural Realism, see Ladyman, supra note 20. 
^®For background on Mortiz Schlick, see Oberdan, 'Moritz Schlick' (The Stan. 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, May 28, 2013), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/schlick/> Jan. 21, 2017. 
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James Ladyman.^® An informational variant. Informational Structural Re­
alism (ISR) was developed by Luciano Floridi, which maintains that an 
analysis of informational structures must be central to the structural the-
30 ory of knowledge. 
This essay advocates, then, the application of ISR to jurisprudence. The 
result is termed the philosophy of legal information (PLI), which calls for 
careful attention to be given to the concepts of information and the levels 
of abstraction involved in legal theories and in the work of lawyers and 
judges. Since philosophers, lawyers and judges all apply multiple types 
of information and at different levels of abstraction, legal theorists need 
to closely analyze the relations among different informational types. A 
legal theory should seek to map in detail the informational structure of the 
analysis of law by focusing on the informational structures in law. Sys­
tems of information exist within law, they interact with and influence 
other information systems, such as commercial markets, politics, and 
even the environment. Jurisprudence today must focus on describing the 
interconnections between informational structures in order to describe 
and predict the evolution of law, the behavior of lawyers and judges, and 
the impact of law on the information environment. In short, jurisprudence 
must now be done from an information-theoretic perspective. 
This essay is divided into four parts. Part 1 describes the historical back­
ground of epistemology in the twentieth century. Part 2 describes Quine's 
epistemology and Leiter's naturalized jurisprudence. Part 3 explicates 
Patterson's Wittgensteinian account of legal legitimacy. Part 4 introduces 
ISR, and shows how it can be developed into a jurisprudence that is more 
viable and useful than the skeptical epistemologies of Quine/Leiter and 
Wittgenstein/Patterson. 
^®See Maxwell, 'Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms' in 
Winokur and Radner, Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and 
Psychology (University of Minnesotta Press, 1970), 182-92; Maxwell, 
'Theories, Perception and Structural Realism' in Colodny and Maxwell, Nature 
& Function of Scientific Theories (University of Pittsburg Press, 1970) 3-34; 
Worrall, 'Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?' (1989) 43 Dialectica 
99-124. 
'"Floridi, 'A Defense of Informational Structural Realism' (2008) 161 Synthese 
219-53. 
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2. Historical Background 
This section describes the historical background of epistemology as it de­
veloped from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuiy. During this 
period, two influential styles of epistemology developed from the work of 
Otto Neurath. One interpretation is associated with the epistemological 
naturalism of Willard Quine; the other is related to the social theory of 
meaning developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Quine's epistemology is de­
ployed by Leiter in his naturalized jurisprudence, and Wittgenstein's the­
ory is developed by Patterson in his modal theory of legal meaning. A 
third theory, structural realism, was founded by Moritz Schlick, who re­
jected aspects of Neurath's epistemology. Part I describes the historical 
background of these epistemological theories. 
1.1 Early Twentieth-Century debates 
These theories evolved from epistemological skepticism that was already 
underway in the late nineteenth century. To understand it and the ISR re­
sponse to it, it is useful to consider Floridi's description of skepticism. He 
reduces it to two questions: 
(K) Is knowledge possible? 
(KK) Is epistemology possible? (Is it possible to know the answer to 
(K))?^' 
The first question (K) cannot be resolved without answering the second 
question (KK) because (KK) identifies the criteria for determining if (K) 
has been resolved. The problem posed by skepticism is that, for an epis­
temological theory to be possible (KK), it must be able to identify criteria 
by which to distinguish between true and false. How can this be done this 
without already knowing which appearances are true and which are not? 
This is the question posed by the skeptics in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.^^ 
^'Floridi, 'The Renaissance of Epistemology' in Baldwin, The Cambridge 
History of Philosophy 1870-1945 (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 531-41. 
^^Ibid, 532. 
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The first question (K) is traditional for epistemology, but the second 
question (KK) was not identified until the eighteenth century. The philos­
opher, Jakob Friedrich Fries,^^ noting that Kant had overlooked the (KK) 
question, develop an analysis of it. Floridi explains: 
Fries summarised the (KK) problem in terms of a trilemma: 
the premises of an epistemology can be dogmatically as­
sumed, or justified by an endless chain of statements, or an­
chored to a psychological basis which is justificatory but not 
in need of a justification.^ 
A recovery of Fries' work led to a broad interest in the (KK) problem 
during the 1920s-1930s,^® which Floridi describes as a Fries-Renaissance. 
An important movement that developed in the Fries-Renaissance was 
known as "psychologism," which quickly became influential in many 
fields of study.^® It argued that all knowledge, including logic, is merely 
psychological in nature.^' Early in his career, Edmund Husserl was an en­
thusiastic supporter of psychologism, but Gottlob Frege persuaded him 
that psychologism could not establish a criterion for truth.^® Husserl and 
Frege then worked together to oppose it. Although they both sought to 
defend some justification for truth-claims against solipsism, their differ­
ent approaches gave rise to the dispute that defined the division between 
Anglophone and Continental philosophy.^® Frege's approach led eventu­
ally to influence Wittgenstein, and through him, the Logical Positivists, 
while Husserl's phenomenology influenced Martin Heidegger, Jacques 
Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, and other Continental philosophers. Hus-
serl's phenomenological method is concerned with justifying beliefs by 
^^Ibid, 533. 
'"Ibid. 
'^Ibid. 
particularly influential movement within neo-Kantianism was 
"psychologism." For a study of it see Kusch, Psychologism: A Case Study in 
the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
''See Dummett, 'Preface' in Husserl, Logical Investigation (New York: 
Routledge, 1982), xiiv-xix. 
'®Ibid, xiiv. 
'^Dummett, The Origins of Analytic Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury, 1993). 
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analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity. It was this approach to justi­
fication that Frege believed did not escape solipsism.'"' Although they are 
all quite different from each other, there are some common themes, such 
as a common interest in logic, mathematics, natural science, critical per­
spectives on the Kantian anal5^ic and synthetic distinction, reconsidera­
tion of the nature of philosophy, and logico-linguistic analysis. These 
themes developed in a variety of epistemological theories that were con­
nected by their interests in these shared themes and in particular, their 
concern with skepticism. 
In the Anglophone context, the work of Frege played an important role 
in developing a focus on conceptual analysis. Frege was concerned with 
the way truth is expressed in the grammar and syntax of ordinary lan­
guage.'*' His approach to philosophy would eventually become widely ac­
cepted as what Richard Rorty termed the "linguistic turn."'*^ According to 
Dummett, the first statement of this approach is found in Frege's Ground­
work for Arithmetic.'*^ In paragraph 62 of that work, Frege investigated 
Kant's question, "How are numbers given to us?"'*^ By this he means 'how 
is it that numbers are given to conscious awareness?' but immediately 
reformulates the question in terms of the meaning (Bedeutung) of sen­
tences containing numbers. Michael Dummett argues that in making this 
quick change, Frege initiated the linguistic turn, since truth, for Frege, is 
justified by the analysis of linguistic usage."^ He argued that the 'sense' 
of an intentional being is its reference to thoughts in the context of lin­
guistic expression. Conversely, truth is language as it is represented in the 
mind. It results when 'thoughts' (what he also called "the third realm") 
are expressed (given sense) in language (derived from context), thereby 
""The critical difference between them centered on their alternative construal of 
what is represented to the mind in intentionality. Ibid, 38-39. 
''^Ibid, 5. 
"^Rorty, The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method (The University 
of Chicago Press, 1992). 
"^Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into 
the Concept of Number (Illinois: Northwestem University Press, 1999). 
""Ibid, 73. 
"^Dummett, 5-6. 
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representing the thoughts in subjective mental objects (intentional be­
ings)."® Truth is therefore intersubjective: it is a matter of using language 
in such a way as to meet the norms and expectations of ordinary grammar 
and syntax among persons sharing in a linguistic community. Analytic 
philosophy employs conceptual analysis as its primary method because it 
presumes that it is only through the analysis of concepts, as they are actu­
ally used in ordinary language, that truth can be gained. 
One of the philosophers who was influenced by these developments 
was Otto Neurath,"® who is best known as one of the Logical Positivists. 
Neurath answered (KK) in the affirmative (he believed that epistemology 
is possible). He hoped to find a physicalist®" epistemology that could unite 
the sciences, but he did not endorse foundationalism.®' He sought to con­
firm beliefs intersubjectively through physicalist language because he be­
lieved that statements can only be compared to other statements and not 
to some prelinguistic raw experience. Therefore, he stated that there can 
be no immediately self-validating foundational claim. For example for 
Neurath, the Cartesian cogito ergo sum, which asserts the self-evident 
truth of one's own existence, is a statement that can only be validated by 
reference to other statements that give meaning to the concepts, "think­
ing" (cogito), "being" (sum), and "concluding" (ergo). Thus, there is no 
vantage point outside of language from which the world can be recon­
structed.®^ Neurath famously summarized the situation: 
"®See Clock, What is Analytic Philosophy? (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
29-30. 
"'See Dummett, 15-21. 
"®See Clock, 34-39. 
"®For background on Neurath, see Cat, 'Otto Neurath' (The Stan. Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, Dec. 3, 2014), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/neurath/> Jan. 21, 2017; 
see also Hamilton, 'Otto Neurath' in Dancy and Sosa, A Companion to 
Epistemology (Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993), 303-04. 
^"Sce, e.g., Neurath, 'Physicalism' in Philosophical Papers 1913-1946 
(Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), 52-57. 
"See Hamilton, 303 ("Neurath was never attracted to the empiricist, 
foundationalist strand [of logical positivism]."). 
^^Floridi describes him in this passage; "For Neurath, the epistemic justification 
of science was not to be achieved by means of an appeal to external facts or 
alleged intuitions, but internally, through logical coherence (which did not 
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We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open 
sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct 
it there out of the best materials.^^ 
Thus, Neurath's epistemology is coherentist, in the sense that it assesses 
truth-claims on the basis of coherence within a system of propositions. 
And, it is holist in the sense that the system of propositions must be as­
sessed all at once, using the tools that language has available for the task. 
There is no dry dock and the work must be done in rough seas while the 
deck is pitching. Two of the epistemological approaches that are of con­
cern in this essay (Quine's and Wittgenstein's) are each a response to the 
(KK) question that evolved in the twentieth century from Neurath's work. 
These, and their applications to jurisprudence, are considered in the fol­
lowing section. 
2. Quine's Epistemology Naturalized and Leiter's 
Naturalized Jurisprudence 
Section 1 suggests that Neurath developed an influential skeptical re­
sponse to the meta-question of epistemology (KK) (Is epistemology pos­
sible?). This section of the essay describes the epistemology of the Amer­
ican philosopher Willard Quine, whose work built on Neurath's and was 
embraced by Brian Letier in his analysis of the American Legal Realists. 
necessarily exclude some ordering relations), instrumental economy, pragmatic 
considerations of social and scientific ends, a rational use of conventions by the 
scientific community, and a constandy open and public debate. Following 
Duhem, Neurath argued that, given an apparently successful theory, rival 
explanations can be made to fit the same evidence that supports it, and that in 
replacing or revising a theory, hypotheses and observation statements come 
under scrutiny as whole networks, not individually. Practical expedience rather 
than absolute truth was determinant." Floridi, 'The Renaissance', 534. 
^^Quoted in Ibid, 35 (citing Philosophical Papers, 92). 
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2.1 Epistemological Naturalism 
Quine's epistemological naturalism is a development of Neurath's work 
that draws from some aspects of American Pragmatism. It represents a 
distinctly American response to the Fries revival. Quine developed his 
epistemology in two influential essays. The earlier of the two was 'Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism' published in 1951.®" In the essay, Quine states 
his argument for epistemological holism that propositions have meaning 
only in the context of the systems from which they are generated.®® In the 
essay, he rejects the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic 
propositions by claiming that we are not able to clearly distinguish be­
tween types. One of the basic theses of analytic philosophy is the claim 
that all sentences are one of only three types: analytic, synthetic, or cog-
nitively meaningless. These types of propositions define the division be­
tween philosophy and the sciences. Philosophers are mostly concerned 
with analytic propositions (those verified through logic), while the sci­
ences are concerned with synthetic propositions (those verified through 
empirical methods). Quine argued, however, that this distinction cannot 
be maintained, since ordinary language is so imprecise that the type of 
proposition (analytic or synthetic) may be difficult to categorize. 
Quine thus rejected logical positivism, which relied on clearly demar­
cating analytic and synthetic propositions. He criticized it for being una­
ble to clearly draw the distinction on which the verification theory of truth 
depended. In summarizing his view, he wrote: 
The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences. In our hands 
it develops and changes, through more or less arbitrary and 
deliberate revisions and additions of our own, more or less 
directly occasioned by the continuing stimulation of our 
^"Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in Gibson, Quintessence: Basic Reading 
from the Philosophy ofW. V. Quine (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 31-53. 
^^He states, "The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most 
causal matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic 
physics or even pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total 
science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience." Ibid, 
50. 
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sense organs. It is a pale gray lore, black with fact, and white 
with convention. But I have found no substantial reasons for 
concluding that there are any quite black threads in it, or any 
white ones.^® 
For Quine, the analytic/synthetic distinction collapses. 
The second essay was published in 1969. In 'Epistemology Natural­
ized'," Quine contends that 'epistemology now becomes semantics. For 
epistemology remains centered as always on evidence, and meaning re­
mains centered as always on verification.'^® He concludes that "episte­
mology merges with psychology, as well as with linguistics."^® He sup­
ports this claim in two stages. He begins by considering mathematical 
logic. He notes that the concept of "self-evidence" came under attack in 
mathematics when the foundational axioms of Euclidian geometry (which 
were justified by self-evidence) failed to account for non-Euclidian ge­
ometries. Thus, "self-evidence" (the intuition upon which foundational­
ism relies) appears to be an unreliable foundation for knowledge.®" Alt­
hough some of the greatest minds in Europe (including Alfred North 
Whitehead, who worked collaboratively with Bertrand Russell) wrestled 
with the logic of set theories to determine a new foundation for mathe­
matics, they uhimately failed.®' The final blow came in Kurt Godel's In­
completeness Theorems,®^ which demonstrated that 'no consistent axiom 
system can cover mathematics even when we renounce self-evidence.'®^ 
Mathematical certainty must remain elusive. 
^®Quine, 'Camap and Logical Truth' in Schilpp, The Philosophy of Rudolf 
Carnap (Open Court, 1963), 405. 
^^Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized' in Quintessence, 259-74. 
^®Ibid, 274. 
®®Ibid. 
^•'ibid, 260. 
®'For a discussion of Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica (2011), 
see Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford University Press, 
1984), 517. 
®^Godel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and 
Related Systems (New York: Dover Publications, 1992). 
®^Quine, supra note 56, at 260. 
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Next, Quine considered Hume's problem of induction. Hume 'identi­
fies bodies outright with sense impressions.'®" All that can be known of 
the external world is known through perception, but perception can yield 
very little knowledge. Quine notes David Hume's problem of induction 
also cast doubt on the possibility of foundationalism. Quine points out 
that the common-sense notion that objects persist in the world is "a vulgar 
confusion."®® That is, we tend to reason inductively such that we assume 
a causal relation from correlated observations, but there is no logical foun­
dation for the assumption. This is Hume's problem of induction. Founda­
tionalist epistemology has failed on this account too, since the intuition of 
self-evidence relies on induction of precisely the sort that Hume de­
scribes. 
What should replace foundationalist epistemology? For Quine it is to 
be replaced by the methods and conclusions of the natural sciences. He 
explains: 
Epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and a 
clarified status. Epistemology, or something like it, simply 
falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of nat­
ural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical 
human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain ex­
perimentally controlled output—certain patterns of irradia­
tion in assorted frequencies, for instance—and in the fullness 
of time the subject delivers as output a description of the 
three dimensional external world and its history. The relation 
between the meager input and the torrential output is a rela­
tion that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same 
reasons that always prompted epistemology; namely, in or­
der to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what way 
one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence. 
®"lbid. 
®'lbid. 
®®Ibid, 269, reprinted in Kornblith, Naturalizing Epistemology (1994) 3 
(emphasis added by Kornblith). 
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Hillary Kornblith named Quine's approach to naturalizing epistemology 
the 'replacement' approach, since it involves replacing foundationalism 
with the natural science of psychology.®^ 
2.2 Leiter's Naturalized Jurisprudence 
Brian Leiter's project of naturalizing jurisprudence is an example of a 
much larger trend in philosophy, in which naturalism refers to the attempt 
to bring philosophy into harmony with the natural sciences, such that the 
rational criteria for knowledge are in accord across the domains. While 
there are several ways that such a harmonization can occur, the common 
commitment among epistemological naturalists is the belief that philoso­
phy should accommodate scientific methods. This commitment runs 
counter to the dominant earlier epistemological theories that sought to 
identify the foundational justifications for beliefs, including scientific be­
liefs. Viewed from this more traditional perspective, the sciences should 
be harmonized to the claims of philosophy, and not the contrary. Natural­
ism thus reverses the priority of philosophy's relation to the natural sci­
ences by subordinating it to the sciences. 
Naturalism has been influential in many areas of philosophy. Owing to 
Leiter's influence, the form of naturalized epistemology that has been 
most important for legal philosophy is the replacement naturalism associ­
ated with Quine.®® Leiter views naturalized jurisprudence as a philosoph­
ically informed version of the central claims of Legal Realism.®® He 
makes his case in two ways that mirror Quine's two ways to naturalize 
epistemology: by asserting epistemic holism and by rejecting foundation­
alism. Leiter argues that Legal Realists made arguments similar to both 
®'lbid. 
®®Alvin Goldman developed a normative epistemological naturalism that some 
legal theorists have associated with Ronald Dworkin's legal theory. And, there 
is a form of substance naturalism (which seeks harmony by looking to avoid 
conflicts of legal theory with the conclusions of the natural sciences), which is 
associated with Scandinavian Legal Realism. See Leiter, 'Naturalism in Legal 
Philosophy', (The Stan. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jul. 31, 2012), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/lawphil-naturalism/> Jan. 
21, 2017. 
®®Leiter, supra note 17, at 39. 
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of Quine's approaches. He illustrates the impact of Quine's holism argu­
ment, which undercuts the distinction between a priori and a posteriori, 
by turning to a central claim of twentieth centuiy Anglophone jurispru­
dence: legal positivism. To illustrate, he considers Joseph Raz's critique 
of H.L.A. Hart's 'Soft Positivism'. Leiter explains; 
Raz offers an analysis of the concept of authority to show 
that Soft Positivism is incompatible, even in principle, with 
the law's possessing the authority it claims to possess. Ac­
cording to Raz, it is a non-normative prerequisite for a claim 
to authority that it be possible to identity the authority's di­
rective without reference to the underlying "dependent" rea­
sons for that directive. This is a prerequisite for authority be­
cause what distinguishes a (practical) authority, on Raz's 
"service" conception, is that its directives preempt consider­
ation of the underlying reasons for what we ought to do, and 
in so doing actually make it more likely that we will do what 
we really ought to do. Authoritative reasons are claimed to 
be exclusionary reasons, excluding from consideration those 
dependent reasons (including importantly, moral reasons) on 
which the authoritative directive rests. Soft Positivism, then, 
undermines the possibility of a rule of recognition claiming 
authority, since for Soft Positivism a rule of recognition can, 
in principle, employ dependent reasons as criteria of legal 
validity: to identify, then, the directives about legal validity 
of such a rule of recognition would be impossible without 
recourse to precisely the dependent reasons the rule was sup­
posed to preempt. 
Hart believes that moral norms inform the 'rule of recognition' that iden­
tifies and legitimates claims to legal authority. Raz's contention is that in 
order for a normative claim to 'serve' to legitimate and authorize a legal 
rule, it must take priority over all competing norms that would challenge 
the legal rule. By taking priority, it excludes the competitors from consid­
eration. Soft positivism, however, seeks to employ 'dependent' norms 
that must be assessed by reference to other norms. Thus, for Raz, Soft 
'"Leiter, supra note 67. 
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Positivism fails to establish the distinction that it is intended to establish— 
i.e., what is the authoritative distinction between law and non-law. 
Quine's Gray Threads and Legal Knowledge 
Quine's naturalism has consequences for the issue, since positivism re­
quires a dichotomy between factual and normative statements that is dif­
ficult to maintain if the separation between a priori and a posteriori col­
lapses. This collapse means that disagreements about the meaning of con­
cepts is inevitable, since meaning depends on contingent experience— 
what Quine refers to as the 'grays' in the passage quoted above.Leiter 
notes that this condition of contingent meaning applies to philosophy gen­
erally. And, thus, 'intuitions about concepts enjoy no privileged epistemic 
status, while claims in empirical science do'. ^ Although the natural sci­
ences do not resolve the issue, they do provide a method for adjudicating 
between alternative meanings. 
When it comes to law, however, the social sciences lack a clear concept 
that sharply delineates between legal and moral. When social scientist 
(and now computer scientists) attempt to model law, they have typically 
developed lists of "non-legal" factors that influence legal outcomes. But, 
this begs the question of the meaning of the concept of law. If the non-
legal factors are substantial for determining the outcome of legal deci­
sions, then are they not indeed law? And if they are not, then where does 
the conceptual boundary lie between law and non-law? Leiter notes that 
...the best social-scientific accounts of adjudication, for ex­
ample, boast predictive success that is so feeble (better than 
coin-tosses, but not much!) that their explanatory models 
with their implicit concepts of law, bear no epistemic coher-
73 ence. 
The predictive ability of the sciences is a key to the epistemic value that 
they assign to conceptual analysis. This brings to the foreground several 
''See supra text accompanying note 55. 
'^Leiter, supra note 17. 
'^Ibid. 
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issues in epistemology, such as the relevance of Bayesian probability for 
legal analysis. 
Legal knowledge without foundations 
Quine's second way to naturalize epistemology is explored by Leiter in 
conjunction with his analysis that Legal Realists were legal pragmatists 
in the sense that they seek for their theories of law to be predictive of the 
outcomes of legal disputes and legal processes.'" They were also anti-
foundationalists, like Quine, because they rejected Legal Formalism, 
which held that legal outcomes are determined by purely formal reason­
ing.'® Leiter believes, with Quine, the Realists sought to replace formal 
legal reasoning with scientific analyses of how legal actors (especially 
judges) make decisions, including the idiosyncrasies that influence their 
decision-making processes.'® Leiter rejects the conventional view of Le­
gal Realism, which he describes as follows: 
(1) a descriptive theory about the nature of judicial decision, 
according to which, (2) judges exercise unfettered discretion, 
in order (3) to reach resuhs based on their personal tastes and 
values, which (4) they then rationalize after-the-fact with ap­
propriate legal rules and reasons." 
Although this description might apply to some of the Realists such as Je­
rome Frank, who was rather extreme among the Realists, other more mod­
erate Realists resisted the "Frankified" claims. Nonetheless, it was this 
extreme version that became the common understanding of Legal Real­
ism. And, it was this predictive version that Hart decisively refuted in 
Chapter VII of the Concept of LawJ^ 
'"Leiter, supra note 17, at 40. 
'^Ibid. at 23-24. 
'®Ibid at 25-26. 
"ibid, 16. 
'®Ibid, 17. (Leiter notes that for a discussion of Hart's argument, see Patterson, 
'Legal Realism' in A Companion To Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(1996) 261-79. 
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The more moderate view was held by a number of influential thinkers 
such as Karl Llewellyn, George Oliphant, and Underbill Moore. Accord­
ing to Leiter, if they are viewed as the interpreters of their movement, then 
the Core Claim of Legal Realism is 'judges respond primarily to the stim­
ulus of facts'.This is not to deny the significance of formal legal rules 
and legal reasoning, but it is to acknowledge that judges apply these rules 
differentiy in different factual settings. He notes that Llewellyn 'main­
tained that one had to understand 'how far the proposition which seems 
so abstract has roots in what seems to be the due thing on the facts before 
the court'".®° And elsewhere he would "speak of 'the fact-pressures of the 
case.'"®' 
If this is taken to be the Core Claim, then Leiter argues, the Realists 
adopt an important philosophical perspective that is compatible with a re­
placement naturalism similar to Quine's. First he notes: 
The Realists are "anti-foundationalists" about judicial deci­
sions in the sense that they deny that the legal reasons justify 
a unique decision: the legal reasons underdetermine the de­
cision (at least in most cases actually litigated). More pre­
cisely, the Realists claim that the law is rationally indetermi­
nate in the sense that the class of legal reasons—i.e., the class 
of reasons a judge may offer for a decision—does not pro­
vide a justification for a unique outcome. Just as sensory in­
put does not justify a unique scientific theory, so legal rea­
sons, according to the Realists, do not justify a unique deci-
82 sion. 
Thus, the first element of Quine's naturalized epistemology, anti-founda-
tionalism, seems to be recognized by the Realists, although on grounds 
somewhat different from Quine. 
The second element of Quine's theory is that the foundational commit­
ments should be replaced by the methodologies and conclusions of the 
'®Ibid, 21. 
®°Ibid, 23. 
®'lbid (citing Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On the Law and Its Study 33 
(1951), 33). 
®^Ibid, 39. 
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natural sciences. Leiter looks to the various attempts by Realists to ex­
plain and predict judicial behavior through the applications of various nat­
ural sciences and social sciences. He explains. 
Jurisprudence, or more precisely, the theory of adjudica­
tion—is "naturalized" because it falls into place, for the Re­
alist, as a chapter of psychology (or anthropology or sociol­
ogy). Moreover, it does so for essentially Quinean reasons: 
because the foundational account of adjudication is a fail­
ure—a consequence of accepting the Realists' famous claim 
that the law is indeterminate.®^ 
For Leiter, then, the Realists applied analogous reasoning to Quine's re­
placement naturalism to justify their project. 
2.3.3 The methodology of Naturalized Jurisprudence 
With these assessments in hand, Leiter directly considers the methodo­
logical status of Anglophone legal theory. He argues that since Quine 
showed the impossibility of a strict separation of a priori and a posteriori 
sentences (Quine's gray threads argument), jurisprudence cannot account 
for the boundaries between "law" and other nearby concepts, especially 
"moral" norms. 
Law and morality are complexly related in the Hart/Raz debate on Soft 
and Hard Positivism. The Soft Positivist position was held by Hart.®" For 
him, the Rule of Recognition is a social rule that has developed among 
judges as to what qualifies as authoritative. It derives from an "internal" 
perspective, in the sense that it is viewed from within the refined social 
circle of judges and the lawyers who practice before them. Leiter explains 
that "this is a Soft Positivism since the only constraint on the content of a 
society's Rule of Recognition comes from the facts about the official 
practice in deciding questions about legality."®® This means that Hart does 
®^Ibid, 40. 
®''Although Soft Positivism was attributed to Hart by Raz, he acknowledges that 
it was his position in the Postscript to the Concept of Law. See Hart, The 
Concept of Law, 251. 
®^Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence, 160. 
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not need to consider whether and how the judges engage in moral assess­
ments of the law, but only the facts of what they do. As Leiter puts it: 
"That morality is a criterion of legal validity in some legal systems is just 
a contingent fact about the actual official practice of those systems, not a 
conceptual requirement of positivism's account of law."®® This is a soft 
positivism then, since it respects the Legal Positivist claim of a separation 
between law and morality, but it also allows that in some systems a moral 
qualification for legitimacy might develop as a social practice. 
Raz is a Hard Positivist, which means that he maintains a stricter di­
chotomy between moral and legal rules. For Raz, it is not enough that the 
Rules of Recognition reflect the actual practices of judges. What is needed 
is a way of determining that the practices are legitimate in themselves, 
and therefore that the judges as lawmakers and the laws they make are 
legitimate. This is accomplished through an analysis of the facts about the 
pedigree of the sources to determine if they have the legitimate authority 
to create law. Raz argues that this pedigree test performs a service by as­
sisting the lawmakers to "comply more successfully with what 'right rea­
son' would require."®^ 
Leiter makes two points about this debate that are of interest here. First, 
that the terms of the debate have been set by the Hard Positivists, since 
the idea of pedigree as providing a constraining function is now the sub­
ject question as the debate continues.®® Second, there remains a question 
about Ronald Dworkin's claim that there are moral norms that are a part 
of the law even though they are non-pedigreed.®® If Dworkin's theory is a 
"third way," then the status of these moral norms that are law without 
pedigree must be ascertained. In developing his analysis of this trilemma, 
Leiter examines John Finnis' version of natural law.®" Finnis is particu­
larly interesting to Leiter because he accepts positivism as the common 
understanding of law among lawyers, but he criticizes Positivists (Soft 
and Hard) for failing to ask how it is that law is valid when it is manifestly 
unjust. What could legal validity mean in the face of moral condemna­
tion? 
®®Ibid. 
®'lbid. 
®®Ibid. 
®®Ibid. 
90-Ibid, 162-63. 
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From this analysis, Leiter develops a critical observation about the cur­
rent state of legal theory. He v^rrites. 
Legal Philosophers have, in my view, been having the wrong 
debate about jurisprudential methodology: legal philosophy 
is, indeed, descriptive and trivially so, in exactly the way 
most other branches of practical philosophy have an im­
portant descriptive component. The real worry about juris­
prudence is not that it is descriptive—of it is (or tries to be)— 
but rather it relies on two central argumentative devices— 
analyses of concepts and appeals to intuition—that are epis­
temologically bankrupt.®' 
The methodological problem facing legal theorists, Leiter argues, has to 
do with conceptual analysis. Since he accepts Quine's analysis of the syn­
thetic/analytic distinction, he argues that conceptual analysis and, there­
fore, philosophy has no useful purpose. 
3. Wittgenstein and Patterson 
Part 2 described Quine epistemology and Leiter's appropriation of it. Part 
3 explores the epistemology of Wittgenstein, who agreed with Neurath's 
skepticism, but rejected aspects of his conception of philosophical 
method. Wittgenstein develops an anti-philosophy that is embraced by 
Dennis Patterson in describing the nature of legal interpretation. 
3.1 Wittgenstein's anti-philosophy 
Wittgenstein offers a radical affirmation of the skepticism of the early 
twentieth century by arguing against affirmative answers to (KK) (Is epis­
temology possible?). It is not that Wittgenstein believes that theories of 
knowledge are impossible, but that the question itself is nonsensical. 
There is no theory of knowledge because knowledge is not an achieve­
ment of the mind, it is an act of linguistic usage. He developed his theory 
®'lbid, 175. 
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under the influence of Frege's theory of sense and reference. Frege's in­
fluence on Wittgenstein is evident in his early work, the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus,^^ which was influential for Logical Positivism. 
Particularly in his early work in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that 
meaning is simply the information content of a communication.®^ Thus, 
when he wrote in the Tractatus "The world is what is the case" and "The 
world is the totality of facts, not things,"®'' he meant that what can be un­
derstood about the world is only the information carried in communica­
tions. Later, Wittgenstein stated that to understand a proposition is "to 
know what is the case if it is true."®^ Karl Otto Apel argued that this must 
mean for Wittgenstein that "to understand a proposition, therefore, means 
to be able to state the logico-linguistic method of its possible verifica­
tion."®® To understand a proposition is to know how to show whether what 
is states is the case or not. This is what the neopositivists called the "ver­
ification principle."®^ Where propositions fail to contain the method of 
their verification, they have no sensible meaning—they are nonsensical. 
Wittgenstein believed that most philosophical statements are nonsensical 
because they fail in this area. He was aware of a psychological problem 
with understanding, because he acknowledged that ineffable qualities ac­
company understanding, but for him these are "philosophically inessen­
tial."®® 
Later, Wittgenstein rejected the project of a logically precise language 
in favor of an "ordinary language" approach. This foundational shift is 
expressed in Wittgenstein's claim that "[pjhilosophy is not a body of doc­
trine, but an activity."®® This is a radical rejection of theory-formation in 
philosophy, which he extends to a rejection of the correspondence of men­
tal concepts to their referent. That is, he denies that concepts and words 
^^Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1999). For an introduction to 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, see, G.E.M. Anscombe, An Introduction to 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1959). 
^^Wittgenstein, Ibid, 4. 
^''ibid, 29. 
®^lbid, 47. 
®®Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy (1973). 
®'lbid, 6. 
®®Ibid, 7. 
^^Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 52. 
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refer to quiddity or essentialism. They have meaning only in the linguistic 
practice that he calls the "language game." For Apel, Wittgenstein's lan­
guage game is a 
...quasi-transcendental philosophical perspective. As he ex­
plains, "whereas it originally seemed as if... the understand­
ing of meaning was to be replaced by the external description 
of behavior, this doctrine now seems to assert that only 
within the framework of a language-game does human be­
havior become possible."'"" 
It might appear that Wittgenstein endorsed a form of behaviorism—that 
understanding is accomplished only through the method of objective cri­
teria of empirically observable action. But Wittgenstein's intention is to 
show that the meaning of behavior is intelligible only within the language 
game because individual acts of verbal expression are unintelligible with­
out the context of the language game in which they are located and to 
which they contribute. 
This explains why Wittgenstein believed that meaning cannot be a "pri­
vate" affair. No one can privately follow a rule because there would be no 
intelligible way to determine whether the rule is being followed without 
some verbal description of the rule.'"' No one can privately follow a rule 
or have a private language, nor can behavior be intelligible, without pre­
supposing a language game that has aspects of a public "habit or institu­
tion. 
As a consequence of this, it is also the case that no one can privately 
follow a rule, a claim Wittgenstein makes in Philosophical Investiga­
tions.^"^ There is, however, some disagreement about what he meant. In 
Kripke's influential book, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Lan­
guage,he suggests that the argument is initially put forward in para­
graph 202'"" and elaborated in the later paragraphs. This is where he ar-
'°°Apel, 32. 
""Ibid, 32. 
^"^Wittgenstein, Philisophical, 75-88. 
'"^See Kripke, Wittgenstein: on Rules and Private Language (1982). 
'""Wittgenstein, Philisophical, 69. 
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gues that no one can privately obey a rule. On Kripke's reading, Wittgen­
stein asserts this impossibility because privately obeying a rule would 
eliminate the distinction between the objective practice of obeying a rule 
and subjectively thinking one is obeying a rule. It follows from this that 
there can be no private language because the rules of a private language 
would necessarily be subjective private rules, which are meaningless. 
There are two readings of Philosophical Investigations, depending on 
whether one accepts Kripke's synthesis. For those who do, Wittgenstein 
is skeptical about the possibility of philosophy. Adherents of this view 
include diverse thinkers such as Richard Rorty, Stanley Cavell, and Alain 
Badiou, who argue that Wittgenstein is developing what Badiou calls an 
"anti-philosophy."^"^ For them, Wittgenstein sets out his critique of lin­
guistic philosophy in the private language argument, but offers no con­
structive alternative. Others, however, reject Kripke's reading. John 
McDowell, for example, contends that Kripke misunderstands Wittgen­
stein. Yet McDowell still defends Wittgenstein, arguing that he is advanc­
ing the claim that there is no "non-conceptual content" and therefore phi­
losophy must focus on linguistic analysis.^"® This disagreement turns on 
the question of whether linguistic analysis can prove itself. That is to say, 
there is a self-evident foundation on which to ground the validity of the 
claims of ordinary language philosophy. The anti-philosophy readings of 
107 Wittgenstein suggest that there is not." 
3.2 Patterson and modalities of interpretation 
Dennis Patterson relies on Wittgensteinian epistemology in his jurispru­
dence. In Low and Truth,^°^ he investigates the question "What does it 
'"^Badiou, Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy (2011). 
'"^McDowell, Mind and World (1996), 18-23. 
'"^McDowell writes, "The fundamental thrust of Wittgenstein's attack [on 
private language] is not to eliminate the idea of a private language, which by 
itself would merely push the line of thought he opposes to this point. 
Wittgenstein's attack undermines even this position, which has already given 
up the idea of a private language, by applying the general moral: a bare 
presence cannot be a ground for anything." Ibid,19. 
'"^Patterson, Law and Truth, 1. 
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mean to say that a proposition of law is true?"'"® He describes both realist 
and anti-realist approaches to jurisprudence, labeling Dworkin a realist 
and Hart an anti-realist. Dworkin's realism is evidenced by his claim that 
legal positivism (Kelsen, Austin, and Hart) hold the view that "proposi­
tions of law are propositions about law.""" On Patterson's reading, 
Dworkin takes legal positivism to be inherently anti-realist in the sense 
that "no sense can be assigned to a proposition unless those who use that 
proposition all agree about how the proposition could, at least in theory, 
be proved conclusively.""' Dworkin's claim is that legal positivism 
views legal propositions as making sense only within the context of the 
whole system of propositions that constitute the law. This claim, Dworkin 
contends, is necessitated by the epistemological commitments of the pos­
itivists, which is "more or less" anti-realist."^ Thus, Patterson concludes 
that "Dworkin's dispute with positivism connects jurisprudence direcdy 
with philosophy of language.""^ Further, 
There can be no effective reply to the positivist's anti-realist 
theory of meaning in law, however, unless an alternative the­
ory of propositions of law is produced. That theory must as­
sign a sense to controversial propositions of law comparable 
to the sense that controversial propositions in science, his­
tory, literature, and academic awards are supposed, by those 
who use them, to have. It must at least show how disagree­
ment about such propositions may seem genuine to lawyers 
and not, as the anti-realist proposition would insist, illu­
sory."" 
For Patterson, this claim is evidence of Dworkin's realism, since he views 
Dworkin's constructive project as seeking to develop "an account of legal 
^°®Ibid Patterson states, "I take the task of jurisprudence to be that of providing 
a philosophical account of what it means to say that propositions of law are true 
and false." Ibid, 4. 
''"Ibid, 7. 
"'ibid (quoting Dworkin, The Philosophy of Law 8 (1977)). 
"^Ibid. 
"^Ibid, 8. 
""Ibid. 
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discourse that shows that the truth of legal propositions is not completely 
settled by legal practice.""^ As to his claim that judges look to extra-legal 
norms for guidance when deciding "hard" cases, Patterson reads as mak­
ing the claim that "the truth (of at least some) legal propositions trans­
cends our [the legal profession's] current practices.""® 
While Dworkin's desire to ground the law in some foundationalist epis­
temology"' is understandable given the consequences for claims of legal 
truth for the distribution of power and the administration of justice, Pat­
terson believes it fails because Dworkin does not establish an epistemo­
logical foundation for his claims, and (he quotes Donald Davidson), 
"[Bjelieving something does not in general make it true.""® Patterson ar­
gues that a successful realist epistemology rests "on the assumption that 
the world makes a contribution to the content and character of our 
knowledge," and "this contribution comes by way of language.""® 
A better approach to realism, according to Patterson, is advanced by 
Michael S. Moore. He argues that "the world...as it 'really is'...guides 
our usage...by making an informational contribution."^^" Moore, too, has 
a coherentist epistemology, in which "justification of any belief about an­
ything is a matter of cohering that belief with everything else we be-
lieve."^^^ For example, "we know someone is really dead by applying the 
"®Ibid. 
''®Ibid. 
"'Leiter describes Patterson's argument this way: "...when Dworkin gives a 
belabored argument of moral philosophy for the constitutionality of affirmative 
action or Posner gives a complex efficiency argument for the law of negligence, 
whatever it is they are doing it does not look much like law. Their arguments in 
short, whatever their intellectual merit and ingenuity, do not sound much like 
lawyer's arguments, the sorts of arguments lawyers could stand up and make in 
court without being laughed out of the courtroom or cited for contempt." Leiter, 
Naturalizing, 139-40. 
"®Ibid, 9. 
"®Ibid, 10. 
'""ibid. 
^^^Ibid (quoting Moore, 'Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization' in 
Precedent in Law (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) 183, 198). 
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best scientific theory we can muster about what death really is."'^^ Patter­
son is critical of this approach, however, because even death cannot be 
"proved" independently of language.He believes that realism depends 
on independence from language such that "unless [Moore] can show 
how...'a conception of facts could exert some leverage in the investiga­
tion of truth,' it seems the claim 'the world makes what we say true or 
false' is, at best, a platitude." Failing in this way to provide an account of 
how "'evidence-transcendent' conditions constrain linguistic behav­
ior,"'^" realism fails for Patterson. 
3.3 Patterson on anti-realism in jurisprudence 
Patterson is similarly critical of what he takes to be anti-realism in juris­
prudence, which he describes in this way: 
The realist wants to say that what we say has to be true in 
virtue of something beyond the agreement of fellow practi­
tioners. Anti-realists deny that any such constraints exist, or 
that the whole notion of anything limiting what can be said 
"truthfully," is an illusion.'^® 
He attributes the origins of this view to Wittgenstein, who he describes as 
holding a "Postmodern view,"'^® which he understands as holding that the 
meaning of words does not exist in an individual mind, but in the shared 
use of the word.'^' Patterson makes this claim regarding Wittgenstein's 
'^^Ibid (quoting Moore, 'A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation' (1985) 58 S. 
Cal. Law Rev. TJl, 294 
i^Ibid. 
""ibid, 11. 
"^Ibid, 12. 
"®He explains: "The view I identify as "postmodern" rejects the project of 
unraveling the connection between propositions and what makes them true. 
From a postmodernist point of view, to say that some proposition is true is to 
say that "a sufficiently well placed speaker who used the words in that way 
would be fully warranted in counting the statement as true of that situation. " 
Ibid, 150. 
"'Patterson, Law and Truth, 12. 
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later works, where he shares his thoughts on rule-following, arguing that, 
in this "postmodernist view," a legal proposition is true "if a competent 
legal actor could justify its assertion...In short, 'true' is a term of com­
mendation or endorsement."^^® 
With this view of Wittgenstein's rule-following comments in hand, Pat­
terson argues that anti-realist arguments may be weak or strong. Weak 
anti-realism simply asserts that "our understanding of the world is based 
on some interpretation of it; that all views of the world are a matter of one 
or another 'perspective.'"^^® This view, which Patterson associates with 
Stanley Fish and Sanford Levinson, is a form of relativism, since what 
counts as a true proposition depends on what an interpretative community 
selects as validating criteria. He associates strong anti-realism with the 
critical legal-studies movement. It holds that "the entire range of issues 
from truth, meaning, objectivity, and the like, [are] little more than a col­
lection of philosophical antiquaria."^^" He makes this claim because the 
strong anti-realists believe that all interpretation is rationally arbitrary. 
The Critical Legal Studies Movement applied this claim to law, with lin­
ger arguing that "[n]o matter what the content of [a] background theory, 
it is, if taken seriously and pursued to its ultimate conclusions, unlikely to 
prove compatible with a broad range of received understandings.""^ Pat­
terson contends that, for the anti-realist, the legitimacy of a legal argu­
ment, depends on the standards of meaning and rationality internal to le­
gal practice. He notes Joseph Singer's contribution to this view: that "the 
^^"ibid, 15. 
"^Ibid (quoting Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986), 9). 
Patterson explains: "Unger states that one should neither accept doctrine blindly 
not reject it as a whole. This leaves one in the difficult position of deciding just 
what to include and what to leave out. To make these choices, "you need a 
background perspective theory of the relevant area of social practice, a theory 
that does for the branch of law in question what a doctrine of the republic or the 
political process does for constitutional argument." This where the trouble 
starts." Ibid. 
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coherence and consistency of legal doctrine is not normative but socio­
logical. Lawyers and judges see the world through the same catego-
3.4 Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism? 
Finally, Patterson advocates his own epistemological theory for jurispru­
dence, which he developed out of Phillip Bobbitt's work in constitutional 
theory."^ Patterson summarizes Bobbitt's view this way; 
(1) "The conventional wisdom treats propositions of consti­
tutional law as if they were propositions about the world (em­
pirical propositions)."""* He means that constitutional inter­
preters treat statements as true if they agree with their theory 
of interpretation, since they "treat[] legal propositions as if 
they were statements about the world." 
(2) This argument is Langdellian in the sense that it is con­
cerned with the "causal" explanation of the nature of consti­
tutional law and theory by looking at the "ideological and 
political commitments [that] are somehow 'behind' or 'be­
neath' the surface play of constitutional argument." 
(3) These Langdellian approaches, however, "miss the tar­
get" because the law is not about the world but about norma-
137 tive practices. 
"^Ibid, 16. Patterson is critical of Singer's identification of background theory 
with sociology. He notes Hart's criticism of this position stating, "One cannot 
understand the nature of justification without investigating how individuals in a 
practice use rules as justifications for another's behavior. Singer thinks that if a 
rule does dictate results mechanically it can play no justificatory role. This is 
absurd. Were it true, we could not understand how rules govern everything 
from cello performance, to chess, to traffic regulation. Are all of these 
activities, which we see as governed by rules, to be dismissed as merely 
behavioral response to cultural stimuli?" Ibid at 18. 
'^^Ibid 128. 
""Ibid, 133. 
'^Mbid (quoting Bobbit, Cor\stitutional Interpretation (1991), 34). 
'^®Ibid. 
"'ibid, 134. 
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(4)To understand the normative foundations of law, the six 
modalities of constitutional reasoning that "constitute the ar­
gumentative matrix of constitutional law" should be exam­
ined."® 
(5)To explain why this matrix of modalities is accepted as 
legitimate among the member of the legal community, he ar­
gues that the modalities "are the ways in which assertions of 
what is the case as a matter of law are appraised.""® Drawing 
from Wittgenstein, he argues that the matrix constitutes the 
practice that defines the legitimacy of constitutional interpre­
tation.^"" 
Patterson argues then, that the practice of law is indeed a practice in the 
sense that Wittgenstein uses the term. Therefore, it provides the normative 
standards by which justification takes place. That is, there is no referent 
outside of the linguistic practice (language game) whereby the truth of a 
proposition can be judged in absolute terms. Patterson argues that the 
same is true for the propositions of law.''*' 
He explains that the meaning of a "corporate act" (such as a legislative 
act) "is given by the practice of statutory interpretation."'"^ He means to 
say that "truth" is not meaningful as a concept in law in the same way that 
it is in the sciences, and both the realists and anti-realists of jurisprudence 
miss the significance of it. Truth, in the epistemological sense, has some­
thing to do with justifying claims to knowledge, but in law there is no 
knowledge external to the processes of law. Legal truth is simply an as­
sertion that a proposition will be understood and accepted as legitimate 
"®Ibid, 136. There are six modalities that Patterson takes from Bobbitt: (1) 
historical; (2) textual; (3) structural; (4) doctrinal; (5) ethical; and (6) 
prudential. Ibid, 137 (quoting Bobbit, 12-13). 
"^Patterson, 'Law and Truth: Replies to Critics' (1997) 50 SMU L. Rev. 1563, 
1589 (citing Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic 
Philosophy (1996) 97-136). 
""Ibid. 
'"'He calls this "the denial of the truth-conditional account of law." Patterson, 
Law and Truth, 19. 
'"^Ibid. 
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by the members of the profession. Patterson thus argues that legal profes­
sionals form a community of discourse that gives the words and proposi­
tions of law their meaning. Attempts to analyze law from other perspec­
tives—moral, economic, and so on, "miss the internal logic and integrity 
of actual practice of legal argument as we find it in countless oral argu­
ments and lawyer's briefs every day throughout the country." 
4.1 Structural Realism and Jurisprudence 
Neurath's epistemology was skeptical in the sense that it denied the pos­
sibility of having knowledge of things in themselves. Quine and Wittgen­
stein reflect this anti-realist perspective in their work and in the jurispru­
dence that it inspired in Leiter and Patterson. Another influential episte­
mological alternative was developed by Moritz Schlick, which rejected 
anti-realism. This Part of the essay describes Schhck's theory, known as 
structural realism and Floridi's development of an informational variant 
of it. It then suggest how a structural realist epistemology might support 
a jurisprudential perspective. 
4.1 The challenge to skeptical epistemologies 
It appears that much of the disagreement between Patterson and Leiter 
involves the difference between Wittgenstein and Quine on the normative 
conception of meaning. Leiter writes, "Truth and Law, then, is 'internal' 
(in some sense that remains vague) to the practice of legal arguments." 
Patterson objects to Leiter's characterization of his account of truth as 
"internal."'''® He explains, "All of these efforts [by Dworkin and Posner] 
to understand law from 'a point of view' (i.e., an interpretive point of 
view) come to naught, for they are based on a philosophically defective 
account of the nature of meaning.''*® A key passage in Leiter's critique 
offers, perhaps, a salient rebuttal: "But a practice of argument can be quite 
'"^Ibid (quoting Bobbitt, 23). 
'"^Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence, 139. 
^"^See Patterson, 'Law and Truth: Replies, 1591. 
'"^Ibid at 1593. 
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legitimate in a sociological sense...and still be utterly illegitimate in the 
philosophical sense....The difference between them thus seems to 
turn on Patterson's assertion, and Leiter's denial, of the validity of Witt­
genstein's claim about the normativity of meaning. Patterson follows 
Wittgenstein by asserting, and Leiter follows Quine by denying, that the 
practice of language is epistemically normative in itself. Quine rejects this 
claim in favor of empirical evidence which is pragmatically assessed. 
If this is an accurate assessment of their disagreement, then there is 
little hope of a resolution between them because they disagree about the 
criteria for truth—the answer to (KK)—and therefore there is no common 
ground between them on which a resolution is possible. Patterson cannot 
accept Leiter's claim that law can look to empirical evidence for legiti­
mation, and Leiter cannot accept Patterson's claim that it cannot. There is 
no possibility of adjudicating between them because their disagreement 
concerns the criterion for agreement. 
This failure to agree on the normative standard for agreement poses a 
challenge to skeptical epistemological approaches to jurisprudence. With­
out a realist foundation, how can common ground be achieved in a liberal 
democracy? That is to say, if one takes a liberal democracy as accepting 
a legitimate plurality of worldviews, then how can common ground be 
achieved for democratic discourse that lacks some shared foundational 
belief? While each theory proposes a way of achieving democratic dis­
course, they each presuppose views about the sources of epistemological 
norms, which itself is likely to be a point of disagreement in democrat 
discourse. 
One approach to this question is to consider how jurisprudential theo­
ries change. That is, why do jurisprudential theories change and why do 
some features of such theories persist despite change? These questions 
seek to understand what kinds of belief are stable and what kinds of belief 
change. 
'"'Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence, 139. 
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4.2 The Structural Realist alternative 
Contemporary Structural Realism developed out of questions about how 
theories change in the natural sciences. It is an alternative to the coherent­
ism and holism of Neurath/Quine and the social practice theory of mean­
ing advanced by Wittgenstein. Quine and Wittgenstein were influenced 
by Neurath, but Structural Realism drew its influence from Moritz 
Schlick, who repeatedly criticized''*® Neurath's anti-foundationalism. 
Where Neurath believed the are no meaningful pre-linguistic experiences 
on which epistemology can be founded, Schlick, who had been trained as 
a physicist under Ernst Mach, believed that "there are a class of Konsta-
tierrungen or quasi-judgements of immediate experience."'"*® For Schlick, 
some sentences are warranted by experience alone. Eventually, Schlick 
and Neurath reconciled, and both together with Carnap, founded the Vi­
enna Circle. 
Schlick's Structural Realism (which he called, "physicalism") was in­
fluential for a number of followers, including Whitehead, Russell, Car­
nap, Cassirer, Duhem, and Eddington.'®" Structural realism maintains 
Schlick's belief in immediate intuition of some ontological entities, but 
for the contemporary Structural Realists, what is intuited are a limited 
number of structural relations. Respect for the Kantian separation of phe­
nomenon and noumenon is maintained, since there is not knowledge of 
'''®Schlick argued against Neurath's coherentism in 'Positivism and Realism' 
(1932), 'On the Foundations of Knowledge' (1934), and 'Facts and 
Propositions' (1935), in Dancy and Sosa, Companion to Epistemology, 465. 
'"^Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge (1918); See also Dancy and Sosa, 
Companion to Epistemology, 465. 
^^"For historical background on the origins of structural epistemology see 
Gower, 'Cassirer, Schlick and "Structural" Realism: The Philosophy of the 
Exact Sciences in the Background to Early Logical Empiricism' (2000) 8 Brit. 
J. for Hist. Phil., 71-106. See also Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (2012); 
Russell, Stebbing, and Heath, 'Symposium: Materialism in the Light of Modem 
Scientific Thought' (1928) 8 Proceeding Aristotelian Soc., Supp. 130-42 
(describing Whitehead's and Russell's contribution to early structural realism); 
Maxwell, 'Scientific Methodology and the Causal Theory of Perception' in 
Lakatos and Musgrave, Problems in Philosophy of Science 148-60 (1968), 148-
60 (discussing Russell and Poincare). 
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the thing-in-itself beyond the assertion that something relates to some­
thing else. Floridi summarizes structural realism as arguing that "the 
structural properties of reality are knowable in themselves, and hence that, 
with a bit of luck, one may get them right." 
An influential contemporary form was advanced by John Worrall, writ­
ing to address the question of theory change in the natural sciences. 
Worrall was reacting to these two contrasting interpretations of how sci­
entific theories about unobservable entities should be interpreted. He ex­
plored this issue historically by questioning what can be learned about it 
from the history of theory change. He explained the issue using an exam­
ple from the history of physics; the change from Fresnel's solid ether the­
ory of light to Maxwell's electromagnetic theory. Fresnel argued that light 
travels as waves through an invisible ether. Maxwell developed the elec­
tromagnetic theory, which dispenses with invisible ethers in favor of 
viewing light as electromagnetic radiation. Does the replacement of Fres­
nel's theory by Maxwell's theory suggest anything about how scientific 
claims about invisible entities should be assessed? One thought at the time 
held that we should not believe that scientific theories give knowledge of 
hidden entities because theory changes like the Fresnel to Maxwell 
change suggest that such claims are inherently unreliable. Things change 
too much. Another claim is realist. It was colorfully argued by Putnam 
that for the consistency to persist to the degree that it does across theory-
changes, there must either be real entities or some sort of magical force. 
Worrall's approach to Structural Realism seeks to find a middle way: 
what is "real" and therefore consistent in theory-change are the relations 
that science discovers. The actual entities are not knowable, but the rela­
tions among them are. Thus, scientific knowledge is knowledge of the 
formal and structural relations among observations. These formal struc­
tures do not change across theory changes—for example Fresnel's equa­
tions fit into Maxwell's theory. Therefore, epistemology is possible, but 
knowledge worthy of the name is of structural relation, not of actual enti­
ties."^ Thus, SR agrees with the Kantian view on phenomena and nou­
mena (that knowledge of phenomena is possible, but not of noumena); it 
'^'Floridi, 'A Defense', 219. 
'"This approach has been particularly influential in the philosophy of physics. 
See, e.g., French and Ladyman, 'Remodeling Structural Realism: Quantum 
Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure' (2003) 136 Synthese 31-56 . 
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examines the meta-question (KK) (is epistemology possible?) in rela­
tional terms and answers in the affirmative. While Kant sought justifica­
tion in the intuited structure of individual subjectivity, ISR seeks founda­
tional commitments in observed relations that are stable among phenom-
4.3 Informational Structural Realism 
Floridi's contribution is to extend SR by interpreting Structural Relations 
informationally. He argues that despite its successes. Structural Realism 
does not adequately explain the nature of the structures to which it refers. 
He writes, "it leaves unspecified the nature of the relata in the struc­
tures."^®'' He proposes an Informational Structural Realism (ISR) as an 
attempt to resolve this issue by claiming a minimal ontological commit­
ment in favor of the existence of structural objects (that the relata are 
between existing entities). This minimal ontological claim entails a mini­
mal epistemological commitment, that "we can safely assume there is an 
outside world."'®® For Floridi, the world is known through information 
about relations among entities. 
Informational structures occur at different levels of abstraction (LoA). 
Analysis of these is a central feature of the methodology of PI.'®® Floridi 
and Sanders develop this method as an inter-subjective approach that can 
further the Kantian project, while not falling into the individualistic psy­
chologism that was criticized by Gassier and C. I. Lewis. The LoA method 
is inter-subjective, socially constructible, dynamic, and flexible. It is an 
application of a modeling technique developed in computer science for 
analyzing machine logic called Formal Methods. It applies discrete math­
ematics to specify and analyze the behavior of information systems. 
The method involves determining the members of sets of "observable." 
^^^Poincare, Cover Maxwell make similar claims. 
'^Floridi, supra note 1, 341. 
'^^Ibid, 361. 
'®®See Ibid, 44-79. 
^"Floridi, 'A Defense', 229. 
'^®Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, supra note 1, 52. Formal Methods is 
developed from the Z verification specification language, which is derived from 
the set logic of Zermelo. 
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When two theories interact, the LoA analysis seeks to determine whether 
the sets of observables coincide, and if not, how are they related? 
For example, compare the sets of observables in two experts: one is a 
wine connoisseur whose observables are concepts that distinguish fea­
tures of taste, aroma, color, and texture. The second expert is a wine mer­
chant, whose goal is to distinguish market-relevant feature of wine. The 
merchant will make the same observations about the wine, but having a 
different objective, the concepts she uses might have a somewhat different 
meaning. The merchant's set of observables will include extrinsic com­
mercial matters such as time of availability, transportation costs, storage 
environment, labeling, taxes and tariffs, and the abstract concepts of sup­
ply, demand, and price. In this example, the connoisseur and the merchant 
may make related, but different, informational analyses of a bottle of 
Amarone della Valpolicello. The connoisseur's observation set might in­
clude characteristics such as robust earthy, ruby red, hints of blackberry, 
etc. All of these terms might also be in the merchant's wine notes, along 
with price history, availability, and location of a case for purchase. In the 
LoA analysis, these sets of observables are for a gradient of abstraction 
(GoA), wherein the connoisseur's set of observables are nested in the 
merchant's. 
At the lowest levels, closest to the relata, the LoA mediate knowledge 
most directly. In this case, the connoisseur's observations are sensual and 
most immediately experienced in conscious awareness. At higher LoA, 
knowledge is not directly knowable, but may still be "epistemologically 
interactable." The merchant, for example, has knowledge of the commer­
cial features of the wine, which are not subject to change and have conse­
quences for its commercial value, but some of these features are known 
indirectly through reports and analysis. Nonetheless, they are known, and 
it may be possible to draw out inferences about the structural relations at 
this higher level of abstraction.'^® 
'^'Floridi defines Informational Structural Realism (ISR) as follows: 
"Explanatorily, instrumentally and predictively successful models (especially, 
but not only, those propounded by scientific theories) a given LoA [Level of 
Abstraction] can be, in the best circumstances, increasingly informative about 
the relations that obtain between the (possibly sub-observable) informational 
objects that constitute the system under investigation (through the observable 
phenomena." Ibid at 361. 
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4.4 Towards an informational account of law 
ISR suggests the need for and promise of an informational account of le­
gal reasoning. It does not seek to understand law as only semantic infor­
mation, but leaves the definition of information open in order to under­
stand how different types of information interact in law and legal institu­
tions. An information theory of law thus seeks to map the informational 
structures that are relevant to legal knowledge and the outcomes of legal 
issues. It seems likely that at least some of these relationships can be 
mapped though the use of advanced computational systems that today al­
low for new relational patterns to be discerned. In biology, for example, 
it is now possible to analyze entire ecosystems from an informational per­
spective by looking at DNA and the exchange of proteins in the environ­
ment. A similar approach should be a goal for legal theory, mapping the 
flow of different types of information—semantic, binary, biological, en­
vironmental, etc. Systems research will be an important part of this study. 
An informational theory of law will pay attention to the complex relation­
ships among coupled social systems.Some of the features, such as 
emergence, self-organization, systemic coupling, and agent-based ob­
jects, are useful for developing computational models of law,^®' particu­
larly in areas where the law is thickly connected to a market or market 
analogues. Computational theories of complex adaptive systems are being 
developed, particularly in economics, and a promising direction for re­
search is to evaluate the presuppositions of these computational models 
against the traditional philosophical approaches. 
Using ISR, legal theorists can now investigate the informational ab­
stractions involved in the various measures of probability, since these 
general introduction to complex dynamic systems can be found at Miller 
and Page, Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computational 
Models of Social Life (2007). For a discussion of law as a complex dynamic 
system, see Ruhl, 14; Jones, 'Dynamical Jurisprudence: Law as a Complex 
System' (2008) 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 873-83; Katz, Stafford, and Provis, 
'Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the "Evolution" of the Law: 
Toward a Positive Theory of Judicial Social Structure' (2008) 24 Ga. St. U. L. 
Rev. 977-1001. 
'®'For a discussion of quantitative approaches to law's complexity, see Holz, 
'Chaos Worth Having: Irreducible Complexity Pragmatic Jurisprudence' (2007) 
8 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Technology (2007) 303. 
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methods of analysis are gaining ground in models of legal analysis that 
are being deployed in, for example, legal search engines, legal assistants, 
and predictive modeling of judicial behavior. PLI considers the relation­
ship between these new computational models and traditional issues in 
legal philosophy. This is a developing area in legal scholarship today. 
While complex systems theory will no doubt be an important contributor 
to an informational theory, there is currently no reason to believe that le­
gal theory is reducible to systems theory.'®^ 
Another concern for an informational theory of law is the science of 
complex systems. While traditional jurisprudence has assumed that the 
nature of law is relatively static and homogenous, empirical analysis sug­
gests that jurisprudence must accommodate evolutionary models of com­
plex adaptive systems where systems are presumed to interact dynami­
cally. The application of systems theory to the analysis of legal systems 
have been met with some support and some resistance, but as Ruhl ex­
plains, theoretical understanding of the law might benefit from embracing 
it: 
One might accept the presence of invisible hands throughout 
social presence invisible throughout life and the value of us­
ing complex adaptive systems theory to understand them bet­
ter, but nonetheless resist applying complex adaptive sys­
tems theory to legal systems on the ground that the law is 
where humans write the rules for other social systems. But 
this misses two fundamentals. First, the legal system, as a 
source of rules for regulating other social systems, should 
take into account how those systems operate. If one wishes 
to regulate a complex adaptive social system, one ought to 
think like a complex adaptive social system. Second, law, as 
in the collection of rules and regulations, is collection the 
product of the legal system, a collection of people and insti­
tutions. Law, in this sense, is simply an emergent property of 
'®^A similar note should be observed about the relationship between PLI and the 
field of Artificial Intelligence and Law. Floridi notes this, suggesting that the 
philosophy of AI was premature in the sense of having arrived before a clear 
sense of the nature of information had emerged. See Floridi, A Very Short 
Introduction to Information, supra, note 1, 2-3. 
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the emergent legal system the same way prices are an emer-
163 gent property of markets. 
An informational theory of law must investigate whether and how law 
operates as a complex adaptive social system and how it is coupled with 
other social systems. 
Thus, for example, understanding the structure of legal knowledge 
(what is known in library sciences as the legal ontology) is a goal, but 
unlike the library sciences version of legal ontology, the informational 
account sought explores the impact that digitalizing law has on the infor­
mational structures (semantic and otherwise) that form the matrix of legal 
systems. Thus, an informational account of legal reasoning deals with law 
as semantic information, but also with the other types of information that 
also contribute to legal outcomes. In considering the behavior of judges, 
an informational account includes not only semantic information of law, 
but also social information such as ideology, economic information, 
moral norms, and even non-semantic information such as the binary code 
that carries semantic meaning and the physical instantiations of infor­
mation that might be relevant. The decisive question is what features of 
the entire information environment contribute to a decision or outcomes. 
Thus, an informational account of law is a cross-disciplinary investigation 
of the entire information environment that shapes law and legal institu­
tions. 
5. Conclusion 
This essay presents the epistemological foundation for an informational 
account of law. To appreciate the significance of such an account con­
sider, for example, an informational account of 1930s Social Darwinist 
jurisprudence of the Eugenics movement. Eugenics social theory shaped 
a wide range of legal thought from freedom of contract in Lochner v. New 
'®^Ruhl, 897. The belief that law is a complex system was advanced first by 
Luhmann, Law as a Social System (2008). 
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York^^ to reproductive rights in Buck v. Be//.'®® But, by 1943 in Skinner 
V. Oklahoma,the Supreme Court could find that the forced sterilization 
of repeat offenders of crimes of moral turpitude violated the equal protec­
tion clause of the 14th Amendment.'®' Subsequently, states slowly with­
drew from performing the practice for "imbeciles," and today the repudi­
ation of Social Darwinism is the norm.'®® How did the change occur? 
Quine's theory stresses the role of empirical evidence, but what evidential 
changes occurred to change the social meaning of Darwin's theory, and 
why? Wittgenstein stresses changing social norms, but why do aspects of 
evolutionary theory persist, even when the social meaning of it has 
changed, and why? If Social Darwinism was empirically flawed, then 
why is population genetics still respectable? And, if was a Wittgensteinian 
language game, how was the normativity of the hermeneutic circle over­
come? These are important questions for jurisprudence that require some 
understanding of how scientific theories change, and what aspects do not. 
But, it seems that since Quine and Wittgenstein (and Leiter and Patterson) 
disagree about the criteria for distinguishing true and false, there can be 
no such understanding. Structural realism is influential in the natural sci­
ences precisely because it offers answers where linguistic approaches do 
not. 
The eugenics legacy also suggests the need for an information jurispru­
dence, which is gaining ground once again, because of recent evolutions 
in genetics in the past few decades. In Adam Cohen's 2016 book. Imbe­
ciles, The Supreme Court, American Eugenics, and the Sterilization of 
^^Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
'®^Buck V. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
'®®S/c/nner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942). 
'^'Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the majority, stating: "We are 
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. 
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and 
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which 
are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear." Ibid, 541. 
'®®For a discussion of the eventual abandonment of the practice of forced 
sterilization and repudiation of the eugenics movement, see Nourse, In Reckless 
Hands: Skinner v. Oklahoma and the Near Triumph of American 
Eugenics (2008). 
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Carrie Buck, he notes several events that suggest the persistence of 
interest in eugenic sterilization, and cautions the following. 
If eugenic sterilization becomes a national movement again, it could, 
hke the last time, be driven by genetics. The Human Genome Project, a 
massive international research effort, is aiming to map every human gene, 
and it is already providing vast new amounts of data and insights about 
hereditary traits. Scientists have raised concerns. One study in the Amer­
ican Journal of Human Genetics cautioned that "there is a significant risk 
that there will be an increased sentiment for instituting eugenic measures 
in the United States." The official website of the federal government's 
National Human Genome Research Institute notes that the eugenics im-
phcation of the Human Genome Project must be "carefully studied."^'" 
An informational theory of law seeks to discover the workings of the 
law by examining the informational structures (relata) among individuals 
and between persons and institutions. These relations are informational 
and sometimes mathematical. They describe rights for individuals, who 
are informational agents—the actually existing ontic entities among 
which relations occur. Some of the relations can be described as complex 
systems, others as linear systems, and many others might not be reducible 
to mathematical analysis. Relational systems interact, and the interactions 
between systems can be identified. Where possible, they can also be mod­
eled. 
Generally, the eugenics laws are understood to be attempts to regulate 
public health by eliminating certain features (low intelligence, for exam­
ple) from the population. An informational perspective can accommodate 
contemporary informational biology: the eugenics movement can be re-
construed as an attempt to use the semantic information of law to control 
the biological information of a population through the repression of the 
propagation of individual information agents. This interpretation casts 
light on the power of the state, through direct and indirect means, to in-
'®®Cohen, Imbeciles, The Supreme Court, American Eugenics, and the 
Sterilization of Carrie Buck (2016). 
''"ibid, 320. 
"^For a discussion of the biological cell as computational system, see Venter, 
Life at the Speed of Light: From the Double Helix to the Dawn of Digital Life 
(2013), 25-46. 
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fluence the genetics of a population. Through the regulation of the envi­
ronment, economy, and socio-cultural policies, government controls diet, 
medications, pollutants, and countless other health-related influences. 
These measures also, of course, shape the genetic makeup of the popula­
tion. Less noticeable are the lasting epigenetic consequences that can re­
sult from traumatic events such as wars, economic upheavals, and 
M^eather-related disasters, all of which are shaped by governmental ac­
tions and reactions. An informational approach to legal theory promotes 
investigating all of these sources as relevant to understanding the law in 
relation to population genetics. While a comprehensive understanding of 
all of the governmental programs impact on the genome is beyond current 
ability, some understanding is possible, particularly through the pattern 
recognition faculties of advanced artificial intelligence. It is important to 
note that, with this knowledge, comes the responsibility to govern inten­
tionally and responsibly. 
Today, ICT have given human beings a means to collect vast amounts 
of diverse data and find subtle patterns in it. New concepts and new issues 
are emerging from these enhanced faculties. They call into question tra­
ditional solutions and habits of mind. To live responsibly in this time of 
extraordinary change is a daunting challenge. To respond to the challenge 
will take substantial resources, human and otherwise, and a willingness to 
rethink many long-held commitments—not only commitments about how 
we think about the law, but even how we think about ourselves. Informa­
tional Structural Realism offers new directions for jurisprudence that give 
it relevancy to the social issues that come with the ICT. It can address 
question about the way legal information shapes and is shaped by other 
types of information—how it shapes and is shaped by population genetics 
for example. And it offers new relevancy for jurisprudence that can speak 
to the challenges that lie ahead. The future of jurisprudence lies in under­
standing how law interacts with other information systems.^'^ 
''^These comments are offered here to suggest why an informational 
jurisprudence is needed, and how it might be grounded. A full theoretical 
account, including a normative jurisprudence that is based on an informational 
moral philosophy, is needed. Subsequent essays will take up these issues. 
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